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6 Parallel reformations in Latin America

A critical review of David Martin's interpretation of the Pentecostal revolution[1]

José Casanova

Those who, like me, entered the sociological field of secularization research after David Martin are forever indebted to his pioneering work, particularly to his classic study, *A General Theory of Secularization* (Martin, 1978). Indeed, whenever I reread this classic I realize how many of what I thought might have been my own ideas were directly or indirectly indebted to him. On many occasions, whether reviewing any of his other works (Martin, 2011, 2002b; Casanova, 2011a) or participating jointly in conference panels, it has also become evident that I can hardly find any major disagreement with his main ideas or with his interpretations on practically any sociological issue.

Only with respect to his interpretation of Latin American Pentecostalism, I've always felt that while I was generally in agreement with his analysis of the phenomenon itself, I had some reservations about his analysis of the Latin American context within which the phenomenon emerged and flourished. In my view, Martin did not pay enough attention to the general transformation of the Latin American region since the 1960s and particularly to the general transformation of Latin American Catholicism that followed the Second Vatican Council and the 1968 Latin American Bishops Conference in Medellin.

When considered within such a broader context, the explosion of Pentecostalism in Latin America can be interpreted as part and parcel of a general process of socio-cultural and religious pluralization of Latin American societies, for which Pentecostalism served indeed as a triggering catalyst but also as its most beneficial recipient. It is for that reason that I speak of parallel and mutually reinforcing Catholic and Pentecostal reformations. Probably neither of the two would have been so successful without the other. The Pentecostal challenge reinforced a dynamic of Catholic reformation which had a global character beyond the region, while the Catholic transformation opened up the opportunity structures within which the Pentecostal explosion could take place.

Tongues of Fire (Martin, 1990) was indeed pioneering insofar as it offered the first systematic and comprehensive sociological analysis of the extraordinary growth of Evangelical Protestantism, particularly of Pentecostal Christianity in Latin America. The continent-wide character of this growth as

well as its explosive character had been overlooked by most social scientists. In this respect, Martin's study forced every analyst of the region to pay attention to the phenomenon. As shown by his extensive and comprehensive bibliography, Martin based his study on a wide variety of sources, including classical studies of historical Protestantism in various Latin American countries, a growing missiological evangelical literature, new anthropological and sociological studies of Protestant communities in various Latin American settings and the emerging debates among Latin American intellectuals, most evidently in Brazil, concerning the social and national significance of the growth of Pentecostal communities (Mariz and Campos, 2011).

Moreover, *Tongues of Fire* was the first systematic study that combined continent-wide empirical analysis with a general sociological interpretation of Latin American religious developments, placing them within a transatlantic comparative framework of processes of modernization and secularization. In this respect the book built upon, yet also extended the analysis beyond his *A General Theory of Secularization*. The title, *Tongues of Fire*, pointed directly to the phenomenon as a new "Pentecost" and indeed there are constant references throughout the text comparing contemporary Latin American Pentecostals and the primitive Christians of the apostolic age.

The characterization of the phenomenon in the book's subtitle as an "explosion" was not an exaggeration. Although there had been since the nineteenth century historical Protestant communities in Latin America, primarily Methodist, Baptist and Presbyterian, they had been unable to establish a self-reproducing dynamic of endogenous growth and with some exceptions in Brazil, Argentina and Chile, they had remained tiny minorities. As Martin (1990: 50) points out, "the take-off came in the late sixties". So the obvious question is why now, and not before?

The answer resides in a felicitous combination of novel internal characteristics of a new type of Protestantism brought by Pentecostal Christianity and external opportunity structures created by a radical break in Catholic dominance. In Martin's (1990: 282) own words,

> what historical Protestantism has lacked and still lacks is precisely the capacity "to go native" . . . . Indeed, it is the incapacity of Protestantism hitherto to cross cultural divides and "go native" that has historically given the edge to Catholicism or led to separatist native churches as in Africa.

This capacity to go native and to cross cultural, ethnic and racial boundaries is precisely the great intrinsic advantage of Pentecostalism which explains its global expansion today not only in Latin America, but also in Africa and Asia, in places where the expansion of Protestant Christianity accompanying British or American imperialism had failed to take indigenous roots before. According to Martin (1990: 282), "the total autonomy of Pentecostalism is part and parcel of its immersion in Latin American culture, and of its successful propagation by persons of roughly the same educational level as the apostles".

But for this successful propagation to take place the external opportunity structures also had to change in a favorable direction. As Martin (1990: 13) rightly points out,

> the spread of evangelical Christianity in Latin America is contingent upon the breakdown of the organic unity of a given religion and national identity, and the general deregulation of religion. . . . That is the emergence of voluntarism itself and the breakup of the union of church and state, people and faith, local community and local church.

The breakdown of the organic unity, the general deregulation of religion and the emergence of voluntarism all crystallized together throughout Latin America in the late 60s and 70s, made possible by three simultaneous processes: massive migrations from the rural countryside to the new urban megacities, the transformation and democratization of the Latin American state and the transformation of Latin American Catholicism.

Most important in my view, was the fact that the breakup of the union of church and state, the deregulation of religion and the growth of religious voluntarism took place generally, except for some places like Argentina, without major resistance from the Catholic Church. The Catholic *aggiornamento* associated with Vatican II and the Medellin Bishops Conference made this voluntary disestablishment possible and the loss of Catholic hegemony derived from it acceptable. There is overwhelming evidence that this was a process of voluntary disestablishment that happened almost simultaneously throughout the Catholic world, as a consequence of the Catholic *aggiornamento*, not only in Latin America, but also in Southern Europe, in post-Soviet Eastern Europe and in the Philippines, as a process of institutional relocation of the church from the state to civil society (Casanova, 1996; Huntington, 1991).

The Vatican II Declaration on Religious Freedom was in this respect the most consequential Council document. As I indicated in *Public Religions in the Modern World* (1994: 72):

> The immediate historical consequences of the Declaration were (a) the acceptance of the modern principle of disestablishment and the separation of church and state and (b) the contestability of any political party or political party officially sponsored by the Catholic Church.

Without this voluntary disestablishment the explosive growth of Pentecostalism in Latin America either would not have taken place or it would have occurred with much greater conflict and much more determined resistance from "the church". In fact, the Catholic Church became a "free church" and ceased to be a church in the Weberian sense of the term, a compulsory

institution claiming the monopoly of the means of grace over a territory. This is a fact which is completely neglected in Martin's analysis (1990: 278–283), skewing somewhat his otherwise convincing and insightful interpretation of what he characterizes as a "Latin Americanization of American religion" as much as an "Americanization of Latin American religion".

To argue that the Catholic Church generally accepted the process without open resistance does not imply that sectors of the Catholic hierarchy, clerical cadres and lay Catholic elites welcomed the loss of hegemony, the deregulation of religion and the unexpected Protestant competition without some, and in some cases with great reluctance. But crucial was the fact that the Catholic Church accepted the process as a normatively acceptable even if perhaps factually undesirable development. Equally significant from a comparative analytical perspective was the fact that the growth of Pentecostalism did not coincide as in the past with a weakening of Catholicism caused by traditional conflicts with secular elites, but rather it coincided with a widespread renewal of Latin American Catholicism, a renewal which in many respects took also a "voluntarist" form that broke with the old organic unity "of people and faith, local community and local church". In this respect, what took place in Latin America was the simultaneous occurrence of a double reformation, namely the emergence and growth of a Pentecostal form of Reformed Protestant Christianity and the reformation of Catholic Christianity.

The most important consequence of this double reformation was the initiation of a process of religious pluralization, which has transformed the culture of Latin American societies and has contributed to the formation of more open and pluralistic civil societies. Martin is undoubtedly right in emphasizing the enormous contribution of the explosive growth of Latin American Pentecostal communities to this radically new development of religious pluralization, cultural transformation and open civil societies. In this his argument dovetails with the analysis of Daniel Levine (2012), the most perceptive social scientist observer of the ongoing religious, social and political transformations of Latin American societies. But Levine (2012: 65–90) puts greater emphasis on the parallel and reinforcing nature of the transformation.

Martin analyzes Latin American Pentecostalism as a transmutation of English and American Methodism, which itself can be viewed as a transmutation of English Calvinism. For Martin (1990: 27) "the structural relationship of Methodism to English society, and also to Welsh society, offers an instructive model for looking at the relationship of Pentecostalism to Latin America today". In a nutshell, Methodism made impossible the Anglican Church's maintenance of a "sacred canopy" over English society. Methodism played a similar function in the United States destroying any remnants of a sacred canopy. For Martin, "the prototypes of Pentecostal and evangelical religion went into full cultural reproduction, ready for eventual transportation across the Rio Grande" (1990: 274), so that "Pentecostalism now performs similar roles with respect to Catholicism in Latin America" (1990: 27).

True, Pentecostalism today would make impossible any attempt of the Catholic Church to maintain or reestablish a "sacred canopy" over Latin American societies. But the related argument I am making is that the Catholic Church had on its own adopted a position of voluntary disestablishment throughout the Catholic world as a consequence of new normative guidelines emerging from the first global ecumenical Christian council with the participation of bishops from all over the world, many of them from regions such as North America, Africa and Asia, where the Catholic Church was a minority denomination and could not envision the plausibility of a "sacred canopy". In the continent-wide meeting of Medellin in 1968 the Latin American bishops reaffirmed the principles expressed in *Gaudium et Spes*, The Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modern World (#73), advocating the establishment of a legal-political order able to protect better the rights of individuals in the public sphere, such as "the right to free association, to free and public expression of one's opinion, and to the free exercise of religion in private and in public".

Pointing to the Catholic transformation by no means detracts from the crucial relevance of the growth of Pentecostal Christianity for the religious pluralization of Latin American societies. It only places this pluralization in a broader framework. Martin's analysis of the most important cultural contributions of Pentecostalism remains fully valid. As was the case in Methodism before, Martin (1990: 44) views the effects of Pentecostalism "as anticipations of liberty, initially realized in the religious sphere and stored there until a shift in cultural underpinnings actually undermined the structural barriers, or protest moved from a cultural to a structural expression". Equally important is the extent to which skills and resources, developed within the community of faith, such as public speaking or organizational abilities, "are transferred to secular aspirations, to business administration and to political movements" (1990: 45). Martin's analysis also emphasizes rightly the role of Pentecostalism in transforming Latin American *machismo* by contributing to a certain feminization of the male psyche, a rejection of violence and by a certain empowerment of women both in the religious community and in the family. Those contributions are unquestionable, but Pentecostals were not alone in the process of undermining the traditional structural barriers. Reformed Catholic groups and secular movements of civil society made their own contributions in the same direction and at the same time, all contributing to the overall transformation.

At the time when *Tongues of Fire* was written the penetration and growth of Pentecostalism throughout Latin American societies was very uneven. It spanned from the explosive growth in some societies like Brazil, Chile and Guatemala, to the much smaller growth in Argentina, Colombia, Peru or Mexico. In traditionally Catholic societies like Paraguay or in highly secularized societies like Uruguay the penetration of Pentecostalism was not yet visible. In the chapters comparing the dynamics in various countries, Martin offers an insightful interpretation of this uneven development. His main

argument is that "the optimum chances for Protestantism exist where the church has been drastically weakened yet the culture has remained pervasively religious, as in Brazil, Chile and Guatemala" (1990: 24). In the highly secular and urbanized environments of Venezuela and Uruguay, by contrast, "there exists a general scepticism about religion *as such* which militates against any form of conversion" (1990: 59).

Thus, according to Martin, the two key conditions for the spread of Pentecostalism are a "weakened church" and pervasive religious culture. Yet the Catholic Church in the late 60s and the 70s was not weaker than it had been decades before or even a century before. If anything, as Levine (2012: 73–75) makes evident with the tables showing "Church Growth and Installed Capacity" in Argentina and Brazil, Chile and Guatemala, Mexico and Peru from 1970 to 2009, parallel to the Pentecostal explosion the Catholic Church was undergoing its own process of dynamic institutional renewal. Moreover, due to the important role which the Catholic Church played in challenging the military dictatorships throughout the region and in offering a relatively safe public space for the organization of civil society, the Catholic Church emerged out of the transitions to democracy in the 70s and 80s with greater societal prestige and trust than it had perhaps ever attained.[2]

Undoubtedly, in the 1960s the Latin American Catholic Church became keenly aware of a series of new challenges which the 1962 *Plano de Emergencia para a Igreja do Brasil* identified as secularization, Marxism, Protestantism and spiritism (Casanova, 1994: 120). But the response of the church to the competitive challenge presented by Protestantism was not to reestablish a new alliance with the state to maintain its monopoly, but actually to embrace disestablishment. The only country in which the church tried to maintain its organicist corporatist alliance with the state was Argentina, a country where the challenge from Protestantism was not particularly acute, or in any case much weaker than in neighboring Brazil or Chile. For a complex series of reasons connected with global Catholic developments, the Catholic Church decided to give up its monopolistic territorial claims and its identity as a state church. This happened not only in Latin America but throughout the Catholic world from Spain to Poland.

A comparative analysis of transitions to democracy and of processes of constitution-making in Catholic countries throughout "the third wave" confirms not only the church's voluntary disestablishment from the state, but also the church's disengagement from political society proper.[3] From a political science perspective, one of the most surprising outcomes of the third wave of democratization was that despite the prominent role played by Catholic elites, groups and social movements in so many transitions and despite the influence and prestige gained thereby by the church almost everywhere, not a single major Catholic party emerged out of any of the transitions of the third wave: not in Spain, not in Brazil, not in the Philippines, not in Poland.

Indeed one can speak confidently of the end of the historical era of "political Catholicism", of the end of Catholic parties, and, in this sense, even of the end of Christian democracy (though some Christian democratic parties may have survived with a much diminished Catholic identity in countries such as Germany or Chile), and most importantly of the collapse of Catholic Action, the main form of church-sponsored Catholic political mobilization throughout the twentieth century (Poggi, 1967).

The case of Spain is instructive here. Political Catholicism never made the transition to Christian Democracy during the embattled politics of the Second Spanish Republic in the 1930s. Indeed, among all forms of political Catholicism one finds throughout Europe and Latin America in the 1930s, only in Chile did a section of the Chilean *Falange*, led by Eduardo Frei and following the democratic principles of Jacques Maritain, make the transition from authoritarian "political Catholicism" to Christian Democracy before the Second World War. Some Catholic political movements in opposition to the Franco regime, particularly sections of the Catalan and Basque nationalist movements, adopted Christian Democracy after the war. But no major Christian Democratic party emerged out of the Spanish transition. Three separate Christian Democratic parties competed in the first general elections in 1977, none of them sponsored by the church. Having failed to meet the minimum electoral threshold of 5% of the vote, none of them gained parliamentary representation and none survived the first post-Franco democratic elections. Spain had missed the era of Christian democracy. The Catholic parties of the 1930s were non-democratic and the democratic parties after the transition became non-confessional.

I am stressing this global Catholic comparative context because I am not as persuaded as Martin (2002) seems to be by the rational choice explanation offered by Anthony Gill (1998) that Catholic disestablishment and the "preferential option for the poor" was a rational response to the challenges presented by religious competitors and secular foes. Ahistorical rational choice theory cannot explain why it was "rational" for the Catholic Church in the 1960s to accept disestablishment and to choose not to mobilize political resources to protect its hegemonic interests, its Catholic "sacred canopy", while it had been "rational" in the 1900s throughout Europe to mobilize Catholic parties against Protestant parties and against anticlerical parties and movements and to organize Catholic Action, and if necessary to lead a "Catholic crusade", against much greater challenges to Catholic hegemony than the ones the church was facing later.

The plausibility structures, using Peter Berger's (Berger, 2014) favorite concept, had changed. What had not been plausible before became plausible now. Indeed, ecclesio-politically Latin America in the 1960s ceased being a Catholic territory, creating novel opportunities for its pervasively religious population to express their religiosity in newly plural and different ways. The Pentecostal explosion became now plausible and possible in a way it had not been before.

In Brazil by 1985, once the transition to democracy had been accomplished, it became obvious that two of the threats identified by the Catholic Church in the 1962 *Plano de Emergencia* had been weakened. Marxism had in fact disappeared as a serious threat, while secularization appeared to be a diminished one. By contrast, Protestantism and *spiritism*, referring broadly to the various forms of Afro-Brazilian religion and to Kardecism, had become established as viable and plausible religious alternatives to Catholicism. Brazil had ceased being a confessional Catholic nation and had become a religiously pluralistic open society.

Unlike in Catholic Quebec or in Spain, the de-confessionalization of Brazil since the 1960s has not led to radical secularization but rather to the explosive growth of religious pluralism. Throughout Brazil, in megacities such as São Paulo and Rio as well as in traditional Catholic towns such as Ouro Preto in Minas Gerais, one finds similar dynamic of increasing religious pluralization. According to the highly reliable 2009 Brazilian census, which documents painstakingly the religious affiliation of every village, every town and every urban neighborhood in the country, the self-reported religious affiliation of the Brazilian population was: Catholic 64.5% – Protestant 22% – Unaffiliated 8% – Other 5%.[4] There are undoubtedly some, but not large, regional differences. But everywhere religious pluralism has increased dramatically since the previous 2000 census, which already had shown significant growth in religious pluralism (Antoniazzi, 2004; Pierucci, 2004; Texeira and Menezes, 2006).

What these broad figures hide is the great internal pluralism one finds within each of them. One finds side by side divergent Catholic trends from liberation theology to thriving charismatic communities, *católicos renovados*, and growing numbers of individuals who claim to be "Catholic in their own way" (Burdick, 2004; Carranza, 2011). One also finds divergent Protestant trends from a large majority of Pentecostal churches and Neo-Pentecostal mega-churches, to the historical Protestant denominations, to Mormons and Jehovah Witness (Freston, 2013; Mariz and Campos, 2011; Oro, Corten and Dozon, 2003). One also finds Afro-Brazilian *Umbanda* and *Candomblé* communities, along with new Amer-Indian religious movements, and immigrant diaspora communities of all kinds, Jewish, Muslim and Bahá'ís, Christian Middle Eastern, Eastern Orthodox, Greek-Catholic, Japanese Buddhist and Chinese Taoist, as well as new Brazilian syncretic cults such as *La Comunidade Espírita O Vale do Amanhecer* near Brasilia or *O Templo Ecuménico Espírita de la Legion de la Boa Vondade en Brasilia* (Prandi, 1991; Motta, 2002; Gomes Marques, 2009). Moreover, permeating all the religious phenomena in Brazil, one finds the ubiquitous, syncretic and protean *espiritismo*.

Unlike in Protestantism there are no separate and autonomous Catholic denominations, but certainly one can talk of growing internal pluralization within Latin American Catholicism, accompanying the loss of Catholic hegemony (Hagopian, 2009). Daniel Levine (2008: 178), one of the most

perceptive analysts of the Latin American religious and political transformations of the last decades, offers a good summary of the consequences of the process of Catholic de-confessionalization and what he calls "the convergence of multiple pluralisms":

> The decay of Catholic monopoly and the growing pluralism of religious expression and organization are accompanied by processes that have moved religious groups, issues and leaders off center stage of public debate, contestation, coalition formation, and political discussion. This is an inevitable consequence of important currents of pluralism that have come with the democratization of civil society and politics of the last two decades. There are many more options and vehicles for expression now than in the past; Church leaders can no longer monopolize the public expression of religious comment, nor can they count on being king makers or critical veto players. The effort is bound to run into multiple figures working the territory. There is simply a lot of competition out there.

What is important to stress is that the Pentecostal explosion, although a very important one, is just one of the expressions of the important currents of pluralism that have come with the democratization of civil society and politics throughout Latin America. From such a perspective, Protestantism appears not as the initiator, or the independent variable driving the process of pluralization, but as one of its important manifestations and carriers. This does not diminish the relevance of the novel social phenomenon, but avoids placing it within an analytical framework that views Protestantism as a manifestation of modernity in contrast to traditional Latin American Catholicism. From Martin's analysis one gets the impression that Latin American societies had to wait for the eventual transportation of the prototypes of Pentecostal and evangelical religion across the Rio Grande in order to initiate their paths of modern voluntarism and pluralization.

Martin clearly avoided the alarmist type of analysis then in vogue within much of Latin America which presented the growth of Protestantism as an external Yankee penetration. He emphatically states that "this moment cannot be dismissed simply as a transfer from North to South America brought about by cultural imperialism. What we have is an indigenous enthusiastic Protestantism rooted in the hopes of millions of Latin American poor" (1990: 3). Yet much of the analysis in *Tongues of Fire* is still framed, in my view unnecessarily, as a new chapter in the long history of "the clash of Hispanic and so-called 'Anglo' civilizations over the past four centuries" (1990: 3). Moreover, the timing of the weakening of the Catholic Church and the growth of Protestantism in Latin America is also linked directly to US global hegemony, as he writes:

> Now, at precisely this juncture Latin American societies have been exposed to the economic power and cultural radiation of the United

> States at the height of its world ascendancy. This cultural radiation includes the voluntaristic evangelical religion central to the original emergence and to the continuance of the United States. *This means that two new patterns of secularization once mutually exclusive have crossed to bring about a distinctive new pattern.*
>
> (1990: 279)

This identification of a new and distinctive Latin American pattern of secularization, divergent from both the European Latin Catholic and the American patterns, is in my view the most fruitful of Martin's insights, which he is going to expand in his later work. In *Forbidden Revolutions* (1996) Martin offers a comparative analysis of Pentecostalism in Latin America and Catholicism in Eastern Europe as distinctive patterns of social differentiation. Consequently he writes (1996: 23–24),

> we can observe at least four distinct trajectories in Christian cultures: Eastern Europe, Latin America, Western Europe and North America. If social differentiation is the working core of the theory of secularization, it takes at least four forms, which do not necessarily converge.

The relevant comparison therefore is not that between Latin Catholicism and Anglo-Saxon Protestantism, but that between Western Europe, in its Northern Protestant and Southern Catholic versions, and the Americas, in the two Northern Protestant and Southern Catholic versions. In continental Western Europe, modernization and urbanization were accompanied by drastic secularization with limited religious pluralism, while in the Americas, North and South, modernization and urbanization led to religious pluralism with limited secularization. The qualifier "forbidden" refers to the fact that the growth of Pentecostalism in Latin America and the emergence of the Catholic Solidarity movement in Poland were not only unanticipated but actually unimaginable within the premises of the traditional theory of secularization.

Concerning the actual effects of the theory of secularization, Martin (1996: 17) writes: "In the West it acts as an implicit guide and censor on what we permit ourselves to see and in the East it was the guiding spirit as an explicit programme to enforce secularization as a political programme". In this respect, the rise of the Solidarity movement was truly a "forbidden revolution" insofar as it was ideologically and politically forbidden by the ruling communist regime. But the qualifier "forbidden" is less appropriate in the case of the explosive growth of Pentecostalism in Latin America. The growth may be characterized perhaps as "revolutionary", but certainly it was not forbidden by any political or ecclesiastical regime in Latin America, other than in Cuba where both forms of Christianity, Catholic as well as Protestant, were proscribed.

Most importantly, the Latin American religious "revolutionary" actors, Pentecostal or Catholic, were not as affected as Europeans by the predictions

of the theory of secularization and therefore were not consciously countering or resisting in any way the march of secular modernization. Ordinary Latin Americans converting to Pentecostalism were certainly "walking out" of the official Catholicism that had served as a collective identifier for the entire society, but in doing so, they were simply exercising their modern religious free choice, not resisting modern secularization.

There is a fundamental difference in the way in which Western Europeans and Americans perceive phenomenologically the relation between individual freedom, religion and modernity as the result of very different dynamics of confessionalization and de-confessionalization. Throughout continental Europe, early modern state formation and the related wars of religion led to the confessionalization of states, nations and peoples. The expulsion of Jews and Muslims from Spain in 1492 in order to construct a homogeneous Catholic nation-state marks the beginning of a process of widespread ethno-religious cleansing that crystallized in the Westphalian system and its principle *cuius regio eius religio* ("the sovereign determines the religion of his subjects").

Southern Europe became homogeneously Catholic, Northern Europe became homogeneously Protestant and in between one finds three bi-confessional societies (Holland, Germany and Switzerland) with their own patterns of territorial confessionalization. Religious minorities were either repressed or had to flee, either to the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth or to the colonies of the New World. Neither the transference of sovereignty from the monarch to the nation or the people, following the French Revolution, nor the institutionalization of universal suffrage in the twentieth century were accompanied anywhere in continental Western Europe by the expansion of religious pluralism. Nowhere in Western Europe does one find massive religious conversions accompanying modernization or urbanization.

European secularization simply entails de-confessionalization, either radical unchurching, the hard secularization of Southern Europe, or "belonging without believing", the soft de-confessionalization of Northern Europe (Casanova, 2014). Ordinary Europeans experience their own secularization as a "modern" freedom, as a liberation not only from enforced confessional identities, but as a freedom from religion itself, as a walking away from tradition, reaching the higher stage of enlightened secular modernity. In any case, European modernity produces religious/secular pluralism, but not the second type of multi-religious pluralism analyzed by Peter Berger in *The Many Altars of Modernity*.

The second type of religious pluralism is the outcome not of internal European modernity, but of the external globalization that accompanied the European global colonial expansion and that led to inter-religious and inter-cultural encounters, in the New World as well as throughout Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Those early modern global encounters before the emergence of secular modernity are the source of the modern global system of world religions.

The United States' story of religious pluralism is well known. The colonies had already become not only the home for all the branches of British Christianity, churches as well as sects, but also the refuge for all the religious minorities fleeing from Europe. Native Americans, African slaves and Mexicans in the Southwest added to the intercultural and interreligious encounters. Modernization and democratization in the United States were accompanied not by unchurching and secularization but rather by religious awakenings and by "churching", that is, by increasing affiliation with denominational congregations based on the voluntarist principle. Continuous immigration has kept enlarging the character of American religious pluralism. Consequently, individuals experience their modern freedom not as freedom from religion, but as the freedom to be born again or to convert to any religion, as a majority of American adults claim to have done (Casanova, 2011).

Unexpectedly, and this is why it can be rightly perceived as a revolutionary development, a similar story of expansion of religious pluralism accompanying modernization, urbanization and democratization is being repeated throughout Latin American societies since the 1960s. To understand this new dynamic, in comparison to confessional Europe, one has to take into account the fact that the process of forced state confessionalization in colonial Latin America was never as comprehensive or intensive, encompassing the entire population, as it had been the case in Latin Catholic Europe. Underneath the officially enforced Catholicism or blended in syncretistic fusion with it, Amer-Indian and Afro-American religiosities survived.

It is this blending of official Catholicism and unofficial popular religions that constitutes in my view the source of the pervasive religiosity of the Latin American people (Lynch, 2012). Even under the intolerant eyes of the Inquisition, Iberian colonial culture showed a surprisingly irreverent respect for religious tolerance (Schwartz, 2008). Moreover, most Latin American societies also became, in the twentieth century, open immigrant societies welcoming immigrants not only from European countries but also increasingly from the Middle East and from Asia. But most importantly, the Enlightenment critique of religion and the premises of the theory of secularization may have affected Latin American intellectual elites, particularly in the Southern Cone and in Mexico, but not the masses. Therefore, unlike in Europe the premises of the theory of secularization never served as a definition of the situation in Latin America, and therefore it did not become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The 2014 Pew Research Report *Religion in Latin America. Widespread Change in a Historically Catholic Region*, the most comprehensive and reliable survey we have, based on over 30,000 face-to-face interviews across Latin America, confirms the validity of Martin's analysis. It shows the process of continuous Catholic de-confessionalization, as well as the explosive growth of Protestantism in practically every Latin American society and the

Table 6.1 Religious Affiliations of Latin Americans. Pew Research Center, 13 Nov 2014. "Religion in Latin America: Widespread Change in a Historically Catholic Region".

	Catholic	*Protestant*	*Unaffiliated*	*Other*
Predominately Catholic				
Paraguay	89%	7%	1%	2%
Mexico	81	9	7	4
Colombia	79	13	6	2
Ecuador	79	13	5	3
Bolivia	77	16	4	3
Peru	76	17	4	3
Venezuela	73	17	7	4
Argentina	71	15	11	3
Panama	70	19	7	4
Majority Catholic				
Chile	64	17	16	3
Costa Rica	62	25	9	4
Brazil	61	26	8	5
Dominican Rep	57	23	18	2
Puerto Rico	56	33	8	2
U.S. Hispanics	55	22	18	5
Half Catholic				
El Salvador	50	36	12	3
Guatemala	50	41	6	3
Nicaragua	50	40	7	4
Less than half Catholic				
Honduras	46	41	10	2
Uruguay	42	15	37	6
Regional total (adjusting for each country's population)				
	69	19	8	4

http//www.pewforum.org/2014/11/13/religion-in-latin-america/p. 14.

role of the Pentecostal voluntarist principle in expanding the dynamics of religious pluralism throughout Latin America.

Table 6.1, *Religious Affiliations of Latin Americans*, offers a telling snapshot of the pluralist religious dynamics of the entire region, country by country, since the publication of *Tongues of Fire*: the continuing decline in Catholic dominance, the increasing growth of primarily Pentecostal Christianity, the relative weakness of the secular option and the initial expansion of religious pluralism into "other" categories.

The total regional average, adjusted for each country's population size is:

69% Catholic – 19% Protestant – 8% Unaffiliated – 4% Other

Roughly half of the Latin American countries have larger proportion of Catholics and smaller proportion of Protestants, while the other half has smaller proportion of Catholic and larger proportion of Protestants. The figures for Brazil, the largest country in Latin America, in the Pew survey are: Catholic 61% – Protestant 26% – Unaffiliated 8% – Other 4%.

Those percentages are slightly discordant with the highly reliable 2010 Brazil census, according to which the figures were: Catholic 64.5% – Protestant 22% – Unaffiliated 8% – Other 5%. According to the census figures, Brazil, along with Panama, are the closest to the average total for all four categories across the region. Indeed, in the case of Brazil and Chile, there are indications that in the last decade the rate of Pentecostal growth has slowed down significantly and it may have reached a plateau.

Uruguay is an outlier, at one extreme, with only 42% of Catholics and 15% of Protestants, but an unusually large proportion of Unaffiliated (37%), and the largest proportion of Other (6%). Significantly, even the country which Martin (1996: 21) had characterized as "the heartland of secularity", which had followed until now what appeared to be a typical Latin Catholic Southern European trajectory of radical laicism, has initiated a new pattern of religious pluralism with significant Pentecostal penetration.

Also outliers are the four Central American countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Honduras) which have the lowest proportion of Catholics after Uruguay, barely half of the population (50%) in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua and less than half (46%) in Honduras), while having by far the largest proportion of Protestants: from 36% in El Salvador to 41% in Guatemala and Honduras. The proportion of Unaffiliated is relatively large in El Salvador (12%) and in Honduras (10%), while the proportion of Other is relatively small in El Salvador (3%) and Honduras (2%).

The outlier on the other extreme is Paraguay, a traditionally Catholic country (89%), with the lowest, yet already significant Protestant penetration (7%), and minimal presence of Unaffiliated (1%) and Other (2%). Significantly, Paraguay and its Guarani population are heirs of the culture and religiosity of the Jesuit Guarani Reductions. Catholic Mexico (81%) has also proven surprisingly resilient, the more so if one considers the massive migrations back and forth across the Rio Grande. It still has a relatively low number of Protestants (9%), and moderate numbers of Unaffiliated (7%) and Other (4%). All Andean republics (Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru and Venezuela) evince similar patterns of still dominant Catholic populations (in the upper 70s), but with rapid recent growth of Protestants in the last decades, particularly in Bolivia, Peru and Venezuela (17%). Venezuela, which Martin's analysis had placed with Uruguay as one of the most secular countries of Latin America, and therefore resistant to Protestant penetration, appears surprisingly close to the Latin American regional average, just slightly more Catholic (73%), slightly less Protestant (17%) and average in Unaffiliated (7%) and Other (4%).

I would like to stress once again that all these percentages hide an expanding religious pluralism within each of these categories. The Papacy of Francis, the first Latin American Pope, has made evident and in a sense legitimated the vibrant internal pluralism within Latin American Catholicism, building bridges between its various trends. The category of Protestants, of course, hides even a much greater, fissiparous and fragmented internal denominational religious pluralism. One only needs to take a look at the long denominational lists under each of the three sub-categories of churches *evangélicas* in the Brazilian census, namely, (a) *Evangélicas de Missão*, (b) *Evangélicas de origem Pentecóstal*, which constitute well over half (60%) of all the Protestant churches, and (c) *Evangélica não determinada*. Mormons and Jehovah Witness appear as separate categories. The Protestant category as a national average also fails to reveal the probable disproportionate attraction of Pentecostalism to minority ethnic, linguistic, indigenous, regional or otherwise marginal groups across Latin America, an argument which is well developed throughout Martin's work (1990: 283, 1996). "Other", a category which has also been growing in Brazil and in the rest of Latin America, hides also an ever-greater pluralism of Afro-Brazilian and *Espiristas* religious groups, Amer-Indian, Eastern Christian, Jews, Muslims, Hindu, Buddhists and other "Oriental" religions, as well as all types of new religious movements.

The thrust of my argument so far has been in agreement concerning Martin's interpretation of the role of Pentecostalism in contributing to religious pluralization, to a culture of voluntarism and therefore to the strengthening of open and pluralist civil societies. But I find his analysis of Pentecostalism as the primary dissolvent catalyst against what otherwise remains a traditional organic Latin Hispanic culture one-sided, in that it tends to ignore or minimize the equal if not greater social role of Catholic groups in the general Latin American transformation of civil society, and more importantly it tends to maintain a stereotypical and, in my view, biased perception of the Catholic Church.

According to Martin (1996: 60),

> the Catholic Church must, in accord with its nature and history, remain intimately bound up in such ties, and in so far as power in the society is mediated through successive levels, the Church mimics these levels and parallels them through its own levels of spiritual mediation. This is the case whether or not the Catholic Church is critical of social arrangements. What evangelical religion achieves by its very existence is a fundamental tear in the fabric of mediation.

Such a quote and such a contrast tells us more about Martin's own ecclesiological theological convictions and his residual anti-Catholic bias than about the relative contribution of Pentecostal and Catholic groups throughout

Latin America in tearing the fabric of traditional organic and corporatist mediations.

I happen to agree fully with Martin's embracing of Halévy's and de Tocqueville's frameworks for understanding the modern transformations of democratic civil societies. One can concur with Halévy's argument that "evangelical conversion assists peaceful cultural evolution rather than violent revolutionary upheaval" (Martin, 1996: 37). One can also share Tocqueville's view that "voluntary religious organizations build up 'social capital' through networks between the state and the individual" (Martin, 1996: 37).

But I disagree with Martin's assessment of the role of the Catholic Church as a traditional force of conservation against such modernizing developments. Both, in terms of assisting "peaceful cultural evolution" and in terms of building up "social capital through networks between the state and the individual", there is overwhelming evidence that in every Latin American country Catholic groups contributed certainly as much as Pentecostal groups may have done. Martin simply prefers not to acknowledge the fact that the Catholic Church in the 1960s underwent a radical transformation, which I have interpreted as a relocation from the state to civil society, that contributed to the cultural transformation of Catholic societies. For Martin (1996: 60) "the Catholic Church is gradually being prised away from the centripetal hubs of power." In my view, the Catholic Church dramatically broke its traditional association with the state and with oligarchic elites, wanting to become in the words of Pope Francis "a poor church for the poor".

Martin (1996: 60) still writes as if, nevertheless and despite this transformation, "the Catholic Church must in accord with its nature and history" remain oriented and bound to the state and to political society. Martin (1996: 7) still writes that "in Latin America the Roman Catholic Church remains for the most part aligned with social conservation of various kinds through being tied in to the social hierarchies of almost every Latin American nation". Certainly one can find plenty of conservative bishops in Latin America, Peruvian Opus Dei members being most prominent among them, as well as conservative clerical religious movements such as Mexico's *Legionarios de Cristo*. But rather than being traditional Catholic residues, as it were, both movements are very modern religious phenomena, clearly supported and promoted by the restorationist papacy of John Paul II. But the restoration is internal toward the church, not external toward society and its power centers. Both movements bring their own blends of "ancient and modern", in some respects not unlike the ones which according to Martin (1990: 163–164) characterize Pentecostal modernity.

Certainly, the hierarchy of the Latin American Catholic Church has been committed to the conservation of traditional gender and sexual morality (Casanova, 2017). But on this issue, as the Pew survey shows, they stand

closer to Latin American Pentecostals than to most Latin American Catholics. On most other social issues it is simply inaccurate to argue that the Catholic Church stands committed to the conservation of the traditional oligarchic and corporatist order in Latin America.

Equally inaccurate is the insinuation that, in contrast to the Pentecostal dedication to "personal and social peace-ability" (Martin, 1996: 58), Catholic culture somehow is still ensnared in the traditional Latin male culture of violence, or that the Catholic Church somehow is still bound to the violence of the corrupt political order, or that when distancing itself from such an order it is ready to legitimate violence, "in a characteristically Catholic manner" that leads "to reformulate the doctrine of the just war to encompass revolutionary violence" (Martin, 1990: 290).

Certainly in the 1960s, in the initial phase of liberation theology, some priests, most famously Camilo Torres in Colombia and the Montonero priests in Argentina, not only joined guerrilla movements but offered ideological legitimation for revolutionary counter-violence against the alleged established structural violence of the oligarchic elites and the oligarchic state (Morello, 2003). But when military dictatorships and the bureaucratic authoritarian state in the 70s truly reached unprecedented levels of state terror and indiscriminate violence against political and civil society, Catholic groups (bishops, priests, nuns and engaged laity) offered courageous nonviolent resistance and suffered the brunt of the state violence.

To insinuate that the Catholic Church today in Latin America or anywhere else is still somehow bound to the politics of violence seems to me a deplorable canard. Catholic groups, the Community of Saint Egidio most prominent among them, are today at the forefront of active peace-making anywhere in the world where civil wars and violent conflicts are taking place. Without explicitly abandoning the moral theological discourse of *just war* theory, many engaged Catholic groups have moved beyond and implicitly at least have embraced a new paradigm of active peace-making.

More than anybody else Pope Francis today represents the official and unofficial face of the Latin American Catholic Church. He was the unanimous choice of the Latin American cardinals partly for the active role that Bergoglio, at the time Archbishop of Buenos Aires, had played at the 2007 Conference of the Bishops of Latin America and the Caribbean in Aparecida. It is hard to find in Pope Francis or in the kind of church he is promoting any of the characteristics that Martin still attributes to the Latin American church in terms of bonds with the state, with "corrupt political bureaucracies" or with political elites, in terms of remaining tied to established corporatist mediations or patronage networks, in terms of supporting any kind of violence, or in terms of authoritarian leanings, or even in terms of a church "promulgating norms for society as a whole and acting as moral mentor" (Martin, 1990: 290).

Martin (1996: 38) is still fond of the formula that "Pentecostals are an option of the poor rather than the liberationist 'option for the poor'". But in

fact his explicit comparisons of Pentecostal congregations and the Catholic base communities that one finds in *Forbidden Revolutions* (1996: 39–43) or in his later work, *Pentecostalism: The World Their Parish* (2002a: 116–118), show that "the contrast is not so stark". In fact, most of the characterizations and assessments Martin makes of Pentecostal communities could be applied almost literally to Catholic base communities and other Catholic voluntary congregations.

The remaining fundamental difference, which Martin stresses, is the authoritarian clerical control exercised by the Catholic hierarchy. Actually, during the heyday of the base communities in the 1970s there were not enough priests around to exercise clerical control over the myriad communities. Indeed, more often than not religious sisters played the role of pastoral leaders of those communities. One could also argue that neither the priests nor the nuns who led those communities felt very strongly the episcopal authoritarian control, at least not at a time when the discourse of "the People's Church" and of the universal priesthood of all believers was so widespread and taken to heart by priests, nuns, as well as by laity. Moreover, the pastoral leadership of priests and nuns, although derived from the charisma of the office, was most likely much less arbitrarily authoritarian than the charismatic leadership exercised by so many evangelical pastors over their own congregations.

In terms of their contributions to the culture of self-autonomy and self-help, voluntarism, civility, peace-ability and the role of women in the feminization of family bonds among the poor, I see no great differences between Pentecostal and Catholic base communities or Catholic groups which had also experienced some form of what could be called adult Catholic renewal. In terms of their overall contributions to the transformation, indeed to the modernization, of Latin American societies, given the widespread resources of the Catholic Church and its networks at all levels of society, it does not seem farfetched to claim that overall the Catholic reformation had a greater weight and influence than Pentecostal communities could possibly have.

Undoubtedly, clericalism remains the greatest disadvantage of the Catholic Church, while the fissiparous, voluntary and charismatic nature of the Pentecostal pastoral leadership remains the greatest competitive advantage of Pentecostalism at least in the short term and within the lower strata. In the long term, the intellectual, institutional and social capital accumulated by the global Catholic Church since the sixteenth century, not only in Latin America but also in Africa and Asia, makes it a formidable competitor to global Pentecostalism.

As to the question explicitly raised by Martin in his essay, "Pentecostalism: An Alternative Form of Modernity and Modernization?", my answer would be: it depends what is meant by it. If it means simply that Pentecostalism, being what Martin calls (2013: 42) "a natural denizen of deregulated religious markets", contributed greatly to religious pluralization in Latin America and therefore to a different type of modernization and modernity than the one represented by European secular modernity, then one can

answer certainly in the affirmative. If it is meant that Pentecostalism somehow represents an alternative form of modernization and modernity than the one being pursued today by Latin American societies, then my answer would be that I do not see any evidence for such a statement.

Martin (2013: 41) is for good reasons extremely cautious about identifying precisely "the impact on social mobility of Pentecostal personal and familial discipline," arguing at most that "mobility probably occurs over generations". He does not seem to share Peter Berger's rather sanguine view about the contribution of Pentecostalism to large-scale socio-economic development in Latin America, as expressed in Berger's formula that "Max Weber is alive and well and lives in Guatemala city". Martin's (2013: 43) own Weberian approach refers mainly to "the emotional, though disciplined Protestantism of the 'small sects'". In any case, one cannot disregard the fact that the most Pentecostal of Latin American societies today, the Central American republics of Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador, where Protestants constitute nearly half of the entire population, can hardly be viewed as models of political stability, democratic government, socio-economic development or open and dynamic civil societies. One could perhaps argue that Pentecostal communities are serving at least as haven from the endemic violence and the general social disintegration which accompanies failed states. If so, then those communities are certainly serving an important social and cultural function. But this also shows the limits of a form of religion limited to a cultural strategy that walks away from larger societal or political issues.

One could gather sufficient evidence for the argument that the Lula state administration in Brazil, despite the seemingly endemic political corruption, building on the effective macro-economic stabilization of the previous Cardoso administration, did more to raise the standard of living of the poor in Brazil, to diminish the extreme levels of economic inequality in the country, and to bring social educational mobility to all the lower classes, than a mere cultural policy of local community autonomy and self-help could ever possibly do. I would not be surprised, however, if disciplined Pentecostal communities were among the great beneficiaries of some of the policies of the Lula administration.

Unless one maintains a radical anti-etatist and anti-societal communitarian principle, or a model of society as unmediated network exchanges, I do not see how any Christian community could reject some notion of a larger societal "common good" or something like the principle of "subsidiarity" as helpful social and even ecclesiological principles.

Martin (2013: 53, 58) rightly sees Pentecostalism "as an expression of the transnational voluntary principle", which is particularly fertile and effective in our age of globalization, when "the geographical mobility of a transnational movement and the social mobility of an autonomous movement of personal and group transformation" can serve as opportune resources. One can easily understand how and why such a religious group can "embrace

an international modernity" (2013: 46). But of course, this is undoubtedly also one of the great advantages of all the other transnational religious communities, such as Catholicism, Islam or Buddhism, in our global age, even if they still have "major territorial emplacements" or at times still promote "a national religious patrimony".

If what is meant by alternative form of modernity is the fact that Pentecostalism today is being constituted as an alternative global imagined religious community along with global Catholicism and other global world religions, then definitively one can answer the question in the affirmative. To enter, however, into an analysis of the particular advantages and disadvantages of Pentecostalism and Catholicism as contemporary transnational religions or as "global imagined communities" would take us away from the theme of this essay, which was restricted to Latin America.

Notes

1 For this volume I was assigned to review David Martin's interpretation of the explosion of Protestant Pentecostalism in Latin America. I will restrict myself to the Latin American context, while keeping in mind his later much broader interpretation of global Pentecostalism. Throughout this paper I am going to use Protestantism and Pentecostalism as interchangeable, insofar as Pentecostals constitute both a majority of Protestants throughout Latin America, and the fastest and most dynamic sector of Latin American Protestantism since the late 60s.
2 Argentina offers a significant exception to the general tendency of Catholic opposition to the military dictatorships in Latin America. The ambiguity and complexity of the Argentinian situation is well documented in Gustavo Morello's (2015) ethnographic analysis of three "varieties of Catholicism" that revealed themselves in response to "the dirty war". Morello (2015: 181–193) labels them "antisecular", "institutional" and "committed".
3 Only in Poland was disestablishment at first not fully voluntary. In 1991, Primate Cardinal Glemp presented an ambiguous public proposal to repeal the constitutional separation of church and state on the dubiously democratic grounds that the rule of the Catholic majority would require the constitutional recognition of the religious confession of the majority of Polish citizens. But in the face of public resistance and, apparently and more significantly, the disapproval of the Vatican and of the Polish Pope, the church did not press the issue (Casanova, 1994: 110–113).
4 http://loja.ibge.gov.br/censo-demografico-2010-caracteristicas-gerais-da-populacao-religi-o-e-pessoas-com-deficiencia.html

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7 David Martin on Scandinavia and music

Pål Repstad

Introduction

This is not a paper on Scandinavian music. David Martin has written about a great many topics, but as far as I know, Scandinavian music is not among them. My ambition is to present and discuss Martin's analyses of religion and secularization in Scandinavia, and then present and discuss a typology that he has presented about Christian attitudes towards music. I admit that the two themes can appear to be quite distant from each other, and I admit that in addition to the fact that David Martin has written about both topics, part of my motivation for putting them together here is personal: I have done research about religious changes in Scandinavia as well as about religion and music. However, I hope that I will be able to show that there are connections between the two topics transcending my personal interest in them.

A contextual and historically contingent theory of secularization

It has been almost 50 years since David Martin first published elements of his general theory of secularization. This was a pioneering work at the time. Professor Martin criticized the then standard unilinear and deterministic model of secularization. He accepted, and still accepts, that there has been a general trend towards secularization in the Christian West, in the specific sense of a social differentiation where several sectors of society have become autonomous in relation to religious power, sectors such as the state itself, administration, welfare, education and the arts (Martin 2005b: 146). Throughout Western Europe, the secularizing process has accelerated since the 1960s, Martin states (Martin 2005a: 86).

To some extent, he also accepts the existence of another master trendtrait, namely individualization. It is because of these general traits that Martin called his theory a *general* theory of secularization (as in the title of his book from 1978). He could also have called it a *contextual* theory of secularization. In 2001 Steve Bruce published an article about David Martin called "In praise of the history man", and David Martin certainly brought into secularization theory some very important historical filters. According to Martin,